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The Pirates tried to sign Kyle Schwarber, and I’m tempted to believe this was a genuine effort. That this needs to be said at all should explain quite a bit about how the Pirates have operated under current owner Bob Nutting: a four-year, $125 million contract offer from them has more than a whiff of “we tried” to it, after all, and nothing in their past suggests they would actually attempt to bring him aboard.
That is, unless, the conditions for their continued profiteering have changed. And sure enough, that’s what seems to be going on. Here’s what I wrote at Baseball Prospectus at the end of November, regarding rumors about the Pirates and Marlins being willing to spend, and their relation to Rob Manfred’s desire for an NFL-style pooling of local broadcast revenues that would lead to a revamped, competition-balancing revenue-sharing system:
The reason [the Pirates et al need to prove they can be trusted with additional revenue-sharing funds] sticks out as more convincing than, say, the idea that this willingness to spend is about “opportunity”—please recall that the Marlins lost Kim Ng because they refused to rise to the challenge of spending even a little bit more to improve—is that whether it’s a salary cap or a revised revenue-sharing system, we’re in for a change to MLB’s economic structure, at least on the ownership side. And as has been said a few times now, the salary cap part feels unlikely, both because there is too much at stake for the owners right now, and because it’s not like the players are going to engage that topic for a second during bargaining.
That idea that the larger markets need to see evidence that teams like the Pirates and Marlins wouldn’t just pocket additional revenue-sharing funds, though? That they would actually use them to put a better product on the field? That checks out, especially since it wasn’t that long ago that a couple of those larger markets spoke up on the issue of having to shell out more of their cut to the rest of the league. In October, I wrote about the Red Sox and Dodgers being open to the idea of an expanded revenue-sharing model, which commissioner Rob Manfred has been pushing—one that pools broadcast revenue together and keeps clubs like Boston and Los Angeles from having quite as much of an advantage in that regard as they currently do. There is a way to convince these teams to go all the way with such an arrangement, even if it costs them money, because the overall health of the sport can make them plenty more, too. If the Pirates, Marlins, Athletics, and whichever other teams are just going to stick under $100 million payrolls forever, though—the Pirates already are profitable but pretend not to be, so it’s not immediately and inherently believable that they would be fine spending additional revenue-sharing money in the future—then why should the Dodgers and Red Sox play ball?
I also wrote that a willingness to spend did not guarantee they actually would be able to, that Pittsburgh and Miami would not necessarily succeed in their goal of recruiting significant free agents given their reputations. The offer for Schwarber wasn’t that far off from the five-year, $150 million contract he signed to stay in Philadelphia, but the Pirates, realistically, had to offer five years at a higher average annual value — maybe $175 million total — or some realistically obtainable markers for boosting the value of the deal. They have to overpay to prove they’re for real to players, but perhaps a competitive-enough offer for Schwarber and some follow-up moves will at least be convincing enough to those in Los Angeles, Boston, New York, Chicago and elsewhere who are watching their intentions with great interest. Much of that probably depends on what happens next.
It’s unsurprising, but you continue to see the idea that “the WNBA offered players a $1.1 million maximum salary” go unchallenged in select large media outlets, even though that is clearly false. What matters, at least, is that the players aren’t buying it, and the Women’s National Basketball Player’s Association continues to counter with a focus on growing their cut of revenue-sharing.
Per the Athletic, the latest proposal submitted in the past few days more than doubles the revenue-sharing percentage that the league most recently offered. That might sound huge without context, but to give you a sense of how little the WNBA has been budging on these figures, here’s the number the WNBPA is asking for: a mere 30 percent.
The Women’s National Basketball Players Association recently proposed that players receive roughly 30 percent of total league and team revenue, sources with knowledge of the discussions told The Athletic. Under the WNBA’s latest salary system proposal, players would receive less than 15 percent of total league and team revenue, with that percentage decreasing over the life of the CBA, based on the league’s revenue projections.
In the union’s proposal, the salary cap would be determined by taking the players’ share of the previous season’s total revenue, subtracting the cost of various player benefits, and dividing that number by the number of teams, sources said. Some of those benefits include medical insurance costs, local transportation costs and housing. The union is proposing mandatory league and team audits to ensure accurate accounting and transparency, the sources said.
The math for the WNBA’s version of revenue-sharing is… fuzzy. In short, they are claiming players can have access to 50 percent of a specific portion of the league’s revenue, which basically means “we want to hide as much of our money from you as possible and continue to share the scraps.” To dust off an old favorite: 50 percent of shit is still shit, and what the WNBA is offering here by being intentionally misleading about what percentage of revenues are even available to be shared qualifies as some shit.
Proposals continue to be traded back-and-forth, but it doesn’t sound like much in the way of progress is being made by the two sides. The players have given a little, dropping to their 30 percent demand — remember, their cousins in the NBA split between 49-51 percent of revenue, and we’re talking percentages not pure dollars — but the league is countering with the same kind of intentionally roundabout accounting that caused the players to opt out of the existing collective bargaining agreement in the first place, since it kept the players from ever reaching its promised revenue-sharing increase thresholds.
Said CBA — which has already been extended twice — expires on January 9. One wonders if it will be extended again, or if the league will finally use the threat of a lockout as more than just a threat to try to get what they want from the players.
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